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CONSTITUTION MAKING IN 1935-1936
HUGH EVANDER WILLISt
The year 1935-1936, that is, the period designated as the Octo-
ber term of 1935 of the United States Supreme Court, was a
significant period in United States constitution making, and con-
tinued certain tendencies which were begun in the October term
1934.
The constitution making in the period we are discussing was
not the result of a convention for proposing amendments, nor
of the proposal of amendments by both houses of Congress-the
rather unusual methods of amendment designated in Article V
of the constitution-but it was the result of the usual method
of changing our constitution, by the action of the United States
Supreme Court. The "nine old men," or perhaps we should say
five of them, did a great deal of constitution making in 1935-6,
for five old men, or even nine old men. The men constituting
this United States constitutional Delphic Oracle revealed for the
most part a wonderful amount of constitutional truth as to the
outcome of various legislative and executive measures in the
United States.
In its constitution making in the October term 1935, the Su-
preme Court did not create any new but it did modify some of
the old constitutional doctrines. The old constitutional doctrines,
however, were those which had formerly been made by the Court
and, of course, the modification was the work of the Court, so
that the changes made by it were entirely its work and related
only to its own prior handiwork. In making its changes, the
Supreme Court sometimes went onto new ground and sometimes
retreated to old ground. In its important decisions, it almost
never kept the status quo. For this reason it should not be called
conservative so much as either reactionary or liberal.
The principal changes in constitutional law in this period re-
lated to our dual form of government, especially in its relation
to the regulation of commerce; to the separation of powers; to
the protection of personal liberty against social control, espe-
cially by the due process clause and by the United States privi-
t Professor of Law, Indiana University.
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leges and immunities clause; and to the supremacy of the Su-
preme Court. These changes generally came about by the Su-
preme Court's declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional.
DUAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT
In the October 1935 term some of the most important constitu-
tion making of the Supreme Court concerned our dual form of
government.
The immunity of federal agencies from taxation by the states
or other subdivisions of government was upheld in the case of
Posadas v. National City Bank of New York,' holding that the
Philippines can not tax a branch of a national bank because such
branch is a federal agency. This decision could be rationalized
either as an application of the doctrine of Collector v. Day,2 or
as an application of the doctrine of federal supremacy as devel-
oped by the case of Veazie Bank v. Fenno.3 In the case of Leahy
v. State Treasurer of Oklahoma,4 the Supreme Court held that a
state might tax an Indian's share of income from restricted
mineral resources held by the United States for his tribe: yet
in the earlier case of Gillespie v. OklahomaP the Supreme Court
had held that a state cannot tax the net income derived by a
lessee of Indian lands, since it would hamper the United States
in making the best terms for its wards; and the case should also
be compared with the case of Graves v. Texas Co.,6 in which the
Supreme Court held that a state cannot levy an excise tax on
gasoline stored in the state, when withdrawn from storage to
be sold to the United States to be used in performing govern-
mental function. The Leahy case would seem to tend to enlarge
the states' power of taxation and to this extent, to change the
nature of our dual form of government.7
In the case of Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board of Equali-
zation, California,, the Supreme Court held that a state may tax
1. 298 U. S.-, 56 S. Ct. 349, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 318 (1936).
2. 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1871).
3. 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1870).
4. 297 U. S. 420, 56 S. Ct. 507, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 351 (1936).
5. 257 U. S. 501, 42 S. Ct. 171, 66 L. ed. 338 (1922).
6. 298 U. S.-, 56 S. Ct. 818, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 824 (1936).
7. See also the case of Schuylkill Tr. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U. S. 113
(1935), where the Supreme Court held that a state cannot discriminate
against federal securities while levying a share tax or franchise tax.
8. 56 S. Ct. 553 (1936). The case of Norfolk etc. Ry. v. State of North
Carolina, 297 U. S. 682, 56 S. Ct. 625 (1936) upheld as a statutory formula
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the privilege of exercising a corporate franchise and may tax
the net income of a domestic corporation doing interstate and
foreign business as well as intra-state business, where the tax
is based on such portion of the entire net income as is derived
from the business done within the state. Other earlier decisions
of the Supreme Court had apparently allowed a state to tax a
domestic corporation on its entire net income though most of it is
derived from interstate commerce," and it would seem that the
general theory of our dual form of government should not pro-
hibit such taxation.
In Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Western Lines,10 the Supreme
Court declared an excise tax on gasoline, purchased outside the
state by interstate busses doing no intra-state business but to
be used to propel busses over highways of the state, is invalid
because a direct burden on interstate commerce, if not imposed
for use of the state's highways. This case, of course, tends to
uphold the federal government's side of our dual form of govern-
ment. Yet in Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Commissioner of Corp-
orations, etc., Massachusetts,11 the Supreme Court permitted a
state to levy an excise tax on a foreign holding corporation which
maintained its principal office, most of its active bank accounts,
corporate books and records, and treasurer in that state and
also paid dividends and held its directors' meetings there. The
court was of the opinion that this was not a burden on inter-
state commerce but a tax for the privileges granted by the
state. In Pacific T. & T. Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington,12
the Supreme Court held that a state may impose an occupation
tax for the privilege of doing intra-state business though it is
carried on by companies engaged in interstate commerce, and
though there was the contention that the intra-state business
and interstate business were so interwoven that the companies
could not withdraw from the interstate business without with-
for determining the net income of interstate railways doing business within
the state, the gross operating revenues within the state as determined on
the mileage basis and deducting therefrom a proportionate average of oper-
ating expenses for their whole business.
9. U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918) ; McGuire v. Tretry,
253 U. S. 12 (1920).
10. 298 U. S.-, 56 S. Ct. 624, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 600 (1936).
11. 298 U. S.-, 56 S. Ct. 887, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 908 (1936).
12. 297 U. S. 403, 56 S. Ct. 522, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 538 (1936).
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drawing from intra-state. In Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Com-
mission etc. of Washington,13 the Supreme Court, however, de-
nied to a state the power to levy an occupation tax measured
by a company's gross receipts on a commercial radio broadcast-
ing company engaged in interstate commerce. These last cases
seem to indicate that the Supreme Court, in the October term
1935, favored the states more than in the past but did not in-
tend to make any general change in the law as to the states'
power to tax interstate commerce.
The question of the scope of the general welfare clause came
up again in the case of Carter v. Carter Coal Company,14 but the
Supreme Court repeated that this is not a separate grant of
power but a limitation on the taxing power, and that Congress
can legislate for the general welfare only in connection with
specific powers granted it.15
The most startling tax decision in this period was that involv-
ing the important New Deal legislation known as the A. A. A.
In United States v. Butler,16 this important piece of federal legis-
lation was declared unconstitutional, not because it was a viola-
tion of our dual form of government in giving the federal govern-
ment a tax power that it did not have-because the court took a
broad view of the taxing power under the general welfare clause
-but because it was in violation of our dual form of government
in permitting the federal government, through its taxing power,
to invade the police power of the states; and because the court
held that Congress could not purchase by contract what it could
not do directly. There was a hint in the case that the federal
taxing power might be used for a federal police power purpose.
This would harmonize the Child Labor Case and the A. A. A.
Case on the one hand with the Veazie Bank Case and the Hamp-
ton Case on the other hand.'7 Perhaps the Supreme Court will
ultimately reach the position that the federal taxing power may
be used for federal police power purposes, and it will cease to
13. 297 U. S. 650, 56 S. Ct. 608, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 615 (1936).
14. 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 749 (1936).
15. Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States (1936) 216, 240, and
378.
16. 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 287 (1936).
17. Burn's, Income and Economic Progress (1936) 3 U. Ch. L. Rev. 173,
197; 20 Minn. L. Rev. 413; 21 ST. Louis LAW REV. 149; 30 Ill. L. Rev. 938;
10 Temple L. Q. 211 (1936).
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state that a polihe power can not be exercised in the guise of
taxation.
However, the Supreme Court's position that the federal gov-
ernment's taxing power cannot be used for state police power
purposes would seem to be contra to all decisions of the United
State Supreme Court except the A. A .A. decision and the Child
Labor decision. Both the supremacy clause in the original con-
stitution and the general trend of the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, establishing the supremacy of the federal
government over state governments when the powers of each
come into conflict, show that the Court was wrong.18 "The terms
of the Tenth Amendment are logically insufficient to segregate
to the States any subject matter whatsoever upon which govern-
mental powers may operate, or any purpose whatsoever in the
promotion of which governmental power may be employed; and
the terms of the supremacy clause logically forbid any such no-
tion."'19 Hence the effect of the A. A. A. decision was nearly to
destroy the doctrine of federal supremacy and to establish in
the place of it a doctrine of state supremacy, 20 in plain violation
of all good constitutional law doctrine and in plain disrespect of
the courts own judicial history.
The police power cases decided in the October, 1935 term
worked as great changes in our dual form of government as did
the tax cases. In the case of Hopkins Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v.
Cleary,21 the Supreme Court held that the Federal Home Owners
Loan Act was an invasion of state rights in allowing a State
Building and Loan Association to convert itself into a Federal
Savings and Loan Association. This case upheld the states' side
of our dual form of government and worked no change in the
former doctrine. In Hill v. Martin, 22 the Supreme Court held
that a Federal statute limiting the power of Federal Courts to
issue injunctions applied to a suit enjoining the collection of
inheritance taxes assessed by state authorities. This case also
18. Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States (1936) 236, 297.
19. Corwin, Commerce Power versus State Rights (1936) 172.
20. Yet in this same term, the Supreme Court held that the Interstate
Commerce Commission has the power to regulate a state operated belt rail-
road engaged in interstate commerce. United States v. State of California,
297 U. S. 175, 56 S. Ct. 421, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 367 (1936).
21. 296 U. S. 315, 56 S. Ct. 235, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 209 (1935).
22. 296 U. S. 613, 56 S. Ct. 278, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 270 (1935).
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upheld state rights and perhaps did not destroy any federal
authority. But in the case of Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Illinois
Brick Co.,2 , the Supreme Court held that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission may prescribe intra-state rates to prevent
discrimination against interstate commerce. This decision, of
course, followed prior decisions of the Supreme Court but recog-
nized federal authority as supreme over state authority.
In Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry,24 the Supreme Court held
that a state in the exercise of its police power may limit the use
of sardines in reduction plants even as to fish brought into the
state from another state, in order to protect the local supply of
fish against covert depletion, on the theory that the state is regu-
lating only manufacture. Of course, a state may even forbid
the shipment of its own game and fish out of the state before
they have been reduced to possession,25 and it may conserve its
natural resources, but this case seems to permit a state to exer-
cise its police power over articles of interstate commerce (a
federal power) where it is necessary to protect its own resources.
This is a power which has frequently been allowed the federal
government, but it is unusual to have the states given this power;
and it is rather difficult to see how the federal government and
the states may both be given such a power. In Hartford A. C. &
I. N. Co. v. People of Illinoi,26 the Supreme Court held that in
the absence of federal regulation, a state may regulate the con-
signment for sale of farm produce on commission by merchants
located in the state though selling goods from outside the state,
and thus permitted the state to exercise a general police power
over goods still in the original package. This gives the states
the same police power that they have been given taxing power, 27
but it is a long way from the decisions of Bowman v. Chicago
and N. W. Ry. -? and Leisy v. Hardin.2 The states' police power
was further upheld by the case of Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v.
Public Utilities Con. of Ohio-o in which the Supreme Court held
23. 297 U. S. 447, 56 S. Ct. 556, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 502 (1936).
24. 297 U. S. 422, 56 S. Ct. 513, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 522 (1936).
25. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519 (1896) ; Foster-Fountain Packing
Company v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928).
26. 298 U. S. 155, 56 S. Ct. 685, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 723 (1936).
27. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 S. Ct. 1091, 29 L. ed. 257 (1885).
28. 125 U. S. 465 (1888).
29. 135 U. S. 100, 10 S. Ct. 681, 34 L. ed. 128 (1890).
30. 298 U. S. 170, 56 S. Ct. 687, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 733 (1936).
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that the Interstate Commerce Commission has not been given
jurisdiction to regulate private carriers and, therefore, they come
within the jurisdiction of the states; and by the case of United
States v. The State of Idaho,31 in which the Supreme Court held
that the Interstate Commerce Commission has no jurisdiction
over spur tracks in the matter of abandonment.
The same effort to uphold state powers as against the powers
of the federal government is manifested in Ashten v. Cameron
County Water Imp., District No. 1, 32 in which the Supreme Court
held that an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act extending the
benefits of such act to the political subdivisions of a state was an
unconstitutional encroachment upon state powers, and that the
state, by consenting, could not make the act valid since that
would enlarge the powers of the federal government. This same
tendency of the Supreme Court was also manifested in Tipton v.
Atchison T. & S. F. Ry23 where the Supreme Court held that a
state may provide for an exclusive remedy for violation of the
Federal Safety Appliance Acts.
Congress' power under our dual form of government received
a striking vindication in the T. V. A. decision of Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority,34 in which the Supreme Court held
that Congress has the power to dispose of surplus hydro-electric
energy available at Wilson Dam; but this case hardly revives the
general doctrine of federal supremacy over the states, because
the constitutionality of the Tennessee Valley Authority was not
derived merely from the commerce power but also from the
admiralty power, the war power, the power to dispose of federal
property, and the spending power .3  The decision on the T. V. A.
is comparable with the decisions in the October 1934 term on
the gold clauses legislation which upheld the money power of
Congress and seemed to vindicate federal supremacy.80 In the
31. 298 U. S. 105, 56 S. Ct. 690, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 677 (1936).
32. 297 U. S. 497, 56 S. Ct. 892, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 910 (1936).
33. 298 U. S. 141, 56 S. Ct. 715, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 485 (1936).
34. 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 427 (1936).
35. Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States (1936) 366; 4 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 399; 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 787; 9 So. Calif. L. Rev. 281; 34
Mich. L. Rev. 680; 11 Ind. L. J. 368; 31 Ill. L. Rev. 78; 20 Minn. L. Rev.
798.
36. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Nortz v.
United States, 294 U. S. 317 (1935) ; Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330
(1935).
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Sutgar Institute v. United States' 7 the Supreme Court held that
the Sherman Anti-trust Act did not prohibit voluntary price an-
nouncements but that it did prohibit concerted action to compel
an open price plan.
The case of Carter v. Carter Coal Co.38 is another case which
put an important limitation upon federal power. The Supreme
Court in this case, through Justice Sutherland, defined com-
merce, as the term is used in the constitution, to include pur-
chase, sale and exchange of commodities between citizens of
different states, as well as transportation. This was a needed
correction of the doctrine that commerce includes only transpor-
tation, which was the basis of the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the Child Labor Case,39 the Hot Oil Case,40 and the
Poultry Case;4' but after taking this liberal and correct posi-
tion, the court held that the commerce clause does not include
production or manufacture and, therefore, held unconstitutional
the labor provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act.
Of course, production cannot so easily be cut off from interstate
commerce, if commerce includes traffic as well as transporta-
tion. Hence it would seem that the Supreme Court nullified its
own definition42
Another case even harder to rationalize is that of Whitfield v.
the State of Ohio,43 in which the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a statute of Ohio prohibiting the sale in that
state of prison-made goods, passed after the Hawes-Cooper Act
of Congress removed the impediment of state control of goods in
the original package. The Hawes-Cooper Act will have to be
rationalized as an exercise of federal power under the commerce
clause; and the Ohio Act, either merely as a condition in federal
37. 297 U. S. 553, 56 S. Ct. 629, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 624 (1936).
38. 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 749 (1936).
39. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918). The only case support-
ing this decision was the discredited case of the United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
40. R. R. Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758,
79 L. ed. 1468 (1935).
41. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55
S. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947 (1935).
42. Corwin, The Commerce Power versus States Rights (1936) 175-209.
43. 297 U. S. 431, 56 S. Ct. 532, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 527 (1936). For a com-
parison of the case of Whitfield v. State of Ohio with the case of Baldwin v.
Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935), see Sholley, The Negative Implications of the
Commerce Clause (1936) 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556; 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 636.
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legislation or as an exercise of a state's general police power
indirectly affecting interstate commerce when no federal legis-
lation would be necessary.
The Child Labor Case held that Congress could not prohibit
the shipment of goods manufactured by child labor because the
act undertook to regulate something which was not interstate
commerce, yet, under the Hawes-Cooper Act Congress appar-
ently may regulate the shipment of goods manufactured by
prison labor because they are articles of interstate commerce.
If the federal government has the power to legislate with refer-
ence to prison-made goods, even on, the condition of some later
state action, it would seem that Congress has power to legislate
as to child-made goods; and, if it can legislate on condition of
state action, it ought to be able to legislate directly without state
action. The fallacy of the Child Labor decision is further shown
by the fact that the Supreme Court would undoubtedly have held
unconstitutional a state statute forbidding the shipment from
the state of goods manufactured by child labor. Even if Con-
gress has a power of legislation over prison-made goods, to up-
hold the state legislation on the subject without violating the
rule against the delegation of legislative power, it will have to
be held either that the states are merely exercising their general
police power though it incidentally affects interstate commerce,
or that the state action is merely a condition in the federal legis-
lation. 4
SEPARATION OF POWERS
In the case of Bronx Brass Foundry Inc. v. Irvington Trust
Co.,45 the Supreme Court held that under our doctrine of separa-
tion of powers the judicial power includes the regulation of pro-
cedure, so that a court may control the privilege of discontinu-
ance of an equity suit after issue joined. The principal work
of the Court in this period, however, on the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers has related to the executive power and here the
Court has tended to place a limitation upon the powers of this
branch of the government and to check the delegation of powers
to it by the legislative branch. In the case of Carter v. Carter
Coal Co.,46 which we have heretofore considered in another con-
44. Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States (1936) 300-303.
45. 297 U. S. 230, 56 S. Ct. 451, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 468 (1936).
46. 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 749 (1936).
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nection, the Supreme Court held the Bituminous Coal Conser-
vation Act 47 was an unlawful delegation of power in delegating
to some producers and miners the power to fix maximum hours
and minimum wages and thereby subjecting a dissenting minor-
ity to the will of a majority in these respects. Delegation of
legislative power to private persons is the worst form of dele-
gation and wholly indefensible.
This decision is in line with recent decisions of the Supreme
Court. For a long time, the Supreme Court had been very liberal
in permitting the legislative branch of government to delegate
legislative powers either under the guise of determining condi-
tions, or making regulations, or administering standards. It
even upheld the provisions of the flexible tariff law permitting
the President to raise and lower tariffs within certain limits.48
But in the October term 1934, the Supreme Court evidently came
to the conclusion that it had gone too far in the past, and, in
connection with some important New Deal legislation, began to
modify the earlier decisions. It did this first in connection with
the so-called Hot Oil Case which involved Section 9 (c) of the
N. R. A., giving the President the power to prohibit the trans-
portation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum in
excess of the amount permitted by the state.49 This position was
further strengthened by the decision holding unconstitutional the
general delegation of legislative power under the N. R. A. 50 be-
cause, so far as it gave power to the President, it was a violation
of the doctrine of separation of powers; and because, so far as
it gave power to private trade associations, it was a violation
of the rule against the delegation of delegated powers, in that
Congress undertook to delegate the power to make law rather
than the power to administer standards. The case of Carter V.
Carter Coal Co. is in harmony with these other later decisions.
Perhaps these recent decisions should not be criticised on this
point. However, their effect probably will be merely to require
Congress in the case of delegation of power to the President to
47. 49 Stat. 991, 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 801 (1935).
48. Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. ed. 624(1928).
49. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. ed. 446
(1935).
50. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55
S. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 1570, 97 A. L. R. 947 (1935).
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be more careful in formulating standards in future legislation.5
It is to be hoped that they have stopped forever attempts to dele-
gate governmental power to private agencies.
It is difficult to determine the purpose of the Supreme Court
in these recent decisions on the separation of powers. So far as
it forbade delegation of legislative power to private organiza-
tions, its decisions may have been dictated by a purpose to ban
plutocratic fascism, as manifested in the provisions inserted in
the N. R. A. by those members of the United States Chamber
of Commerce who worked this scheme up.514 So far as it forbade
delegation of power to the President, it was not clear whether
the Supreme Court was trying to protect our doctrine of separa-
tion of powers or to protect the capitalistic system. The pur-
pose of the Supreme Court might easily be held to be the pro-
tection of our doctrine of separation of powers if we had any
one clear doctrine on the subject, but, with the doctrine of con-
fusion of powers which now prevails, apparently it is not so
important which branch of the government exercises the power.
SOVEREIGNTY
In the case of Carter v. Carter Coal Company,5 2 the Supreme
Court again added insult to injury by informing the states that
they are not sovereign in any true sense. Of course, the states
as entities are not sovereign in any sense in which that term
can be defined, and have never been sovereign. This in general
has been the position of the United States Supreme Court
throughout its history.5 This recent pronouncement of the Su-
preme Court, therefore, is consistent with its prior position.
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AGAINST
SOCIAL CONTROL
In the protection of personal liberty against social control un-
der the written guarantees found in the original constitution
and the formal amendments thereto, and under the additional
guarantees which have been read into our constitution by the
Supreme Court, the latter body, in the October term 1935, con-
51. 45 Yale L. J. 293. Powell, The Processing Tax and the Social Secur-
ity Act (1936) 5 Brook. L. R. 125.
51a. Willis, The Constitution and the Roosevelt New Deal, 22 Ind. U.
Alumni Q. 128, 258.
52. 298 U. S. 238, 294, 56 S. Ct. 855, 865, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 749 (1936).
53. Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States (1936) 29, 59.
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN 1935-1936
tinued its prior policy of being sometimes conservative or re-
actionary and sometimes liberal. We shall hastily consider the
decisions in this term in order to note these two tendencies on
the part of the court.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
One of the liberal decisions on due process of law in this term
was that of Gulf Refining Company v. FoxY 4 In this case, the
Supreme Court held that gasoline filling stations, operated and
controlled by oil companies under modified leases and agency
agreements, were stores; and came within a chain store tax act
imposing a graduated license tax upon stores owned, operated,
maintained, or controlled by the same person, firm, or corpora-
tion, co-partnership or association. This case manifests the same
liberality as was manifested in the case of Fox v. Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey,55 which was decided in the October
term 1934, and which held that a chain store license act as ap-
plied to filling stations was due process of law. Another liberal
decision was that of Pacific States Box and Basket Co. v. White,56
in which the Supreme Court held that the prescription of stand-
ard containers for strawberries and raspberries may be a proper
exercise of the police power, and, therefore, due process of law.
This decision should be compared with such older decisions as
the decision of Frost v. Chicago57 by the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois and the decision of Jay Burns Baking Company v. Bryan 8
by the United States Supreme Court. A very liberal decision of
the October term 1935 was that holding that the guarantee of
due process of law includes the guarantee against a confession
obtained by torture (a phase of self-incrimination). This deci-
sion occurred in the case of Brown v. State of Mississippi59
This case continued the tendency to make due process of law
include all other constitutional guarantees against the social
control of personal liberty. One of the most conspicuous illus-
trations of this tendency was found in the decision of Mooney V.
54. 297 U. S. 381, 56 S. Ct. 510, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 561 (1936).
55. 294 U. S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333, 79 L. ed. 780 (1935).
56. 296 U. S. 176, 56 S. Ct. 159, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 133 (1935).
57. 178 Ill. 250, 52 N. E. 869 (1899).
58. 264 U. S. 504 (1924). But cf. P. F. Petersen Baking Company v.
Bryan, 290 U. S. 579 (1934).
59. 297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 479 (1936).
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Holohan, ° decided in the October term 1934 of the Supreme
Court, in which the Supreme Court made due process as a mat-
ter of procedure include, as a part of 'the essentials of an orderly
course of procedure, protection against the known use of per-
jured testimony by the prosecution. The case of Wheeling Steel
Corporation v. Fox61 showed a liberal tendency, in the matter
of state taxation, in permitting a state to tax intangibles where
they had acquired a situs because they were an integral part of
some local business, even though they were all taxed under the
rule mobilia sequuntur personam in the state of the corporations
creation.
A case showing a conservative or reactionary attitude on the
part of the court in this term was Great Northern Ry. v. Weeks.0
2
In this case, the Supreme Court held that an over-assessment of
property for taxation was not due process of law even though
there was no discrimination. This case has been severely criti-
cised.63 Another conservative decision was that of St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States which held that the findings
of the Secretary of Agriculture are subject to independent judi-
cial review by courts upon both the facts and the law, to deter-
mine whether or not constitutional protection has been violated.
This case only followed some comparatively recent decisions ;,"
but it should be compared with the decision of Morgan v. United
States6 and the decision of Baltimore & Ohio R. R. V. United
States7 in which the Supreme Court held that the fact-findings
of the Secretary of Agriculture under the Packers and Stock
Yards Act are conclusive, and that the Interstate Commerce
Commission alone is authorized to decide on the weight of evi-
dence and significance of facts in determining divisions of joint
rates. Another somewhat conservative decision was that of
Southern Ry. v. Lunsford68 in which the Supreme Court held
that the Boiler Inspection Act imposes an absolute and continu-
60. 294 U. S. 103, 55 Ct. 340, 79 L. ed. 791, 98 A. L. R. 406 (1935).
61. 298 U. S. 193, 56 S. Ct. 773, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 809 (1936).
62. 297 U. S. 135, 56 S. Ct. 426, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 396 (1936).
63. 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1012; 84 U. Pa. L. R. 784; 1 Mo. L. R. 205; 4
George Wash. L. R. 538.
64. 298 U. S. 38, 56 S. Ct. 720, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 679 (1936).
65. Willis, Constitutional Law (1936) 669-672.
66. 298 U. S.-, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 901 (1936).
67. 298 U. S.-, 56 S. Ct. 797, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 853 (1936).
68. 297 U. S. 398, 56 S. Ct. 504, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 536 (1936).
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ig duty to maintain a locomotive and all its parts in proper
condition but this does not include experimental devices which
may prove helpful in emergencies.
The most reactionary due process decision of this period was
probably that of Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo 9 In this
case the Supreme Court again upheld freedom of contract, and
held that there was not sufficient social interest in a minimum
wage law to permit a state to delimit the personal liberty in
freedom of contract. This case follows the decision in Adkins v.
Children's Hospital,7 in which the Supreme Court held that a
federal minimum wage law was not due process of law. The
result of these two decisions is to free the capitalistic system
from social control, in the respect of minimum wage legislation,
both by the federal government and by the state governments.
This case, therefore, is as reactionary as the A. A. A. decision
and the Bituminous Coal decision rendered in this same period
and as reactionary as the decisions declaring the Frazier-Lempke
Act" and the Railroad Retirement Act 72 unconstitutional, both
decided in the October, 1934 term. All of these cases should be
compared with the recent liberal decision of Nebbi v. People of
New York,73 in which the Supreme Court broke the general taboo
against price-fixing by permitting the regulation of prices out-
side of the field of public utilities.
EQUALITY
The Supreme Court rendered a conservative decision in Col-
gate v. Harvey74 in holding that a state income and franchise
69. 298 U. S.-, 56 S. Ct. 918, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 921 (1936).
70. 261 U. S. 525 (1923). In the three minimum wage cases which have
come before the Supreme Court, ten justices have votes for and seven
against the constitutionality of minimum wage laws. The justices who have
been of the opinion that such laws are constitutional were Hughes, Stone,
Cardozo, Holmes, Brandeis, Taft, Clarke, Day, Pitney, and Sanford. The
seven justices of the contrary opinion were Van Devanter, McReynolds,
Sutherland, Butler, White, McKenna, Roberts. There is no question that
the ten include the greatest jurists. Therefore, the constitution is not what
the majority of the jurists say nor what the best jurists say, but what thejurists who happen to stay on the bench the longest time say. Dillard, "A
Supreme Court Majority," 173 Harpers 598.
71. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 Ct.
854, 79 L. ed. 1593, 97 A. L. R. 1106 (1935).
72. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330, 55 Ct. 758,
79 L. ed. 1468 (1935).
73. 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940, 89 A. L. R. 1469 (1934).
74. 296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 225 (1935).
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tax, exempting from the tax the net income from money loaned
within the state at not more than 5%, was a violation of the
equal protection clause. It rendered another conservative deci-
sion in the case of Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck7 ' where it held
that there was not a proper basis for classification between well
advertised trade name dealers, engaged in business before the
statute became effective, and unadvertised dealers, who became
such subsequent to that date. This decision was somewhat
counteracted by the decision of Borden's Farm Products Co. v.
Ten Eyck76 where the Supreme Court held that there was a
proper basis for classification between dealers in unadvertised
milk, selling fluid milk to stores, and dealers selling under a well
advertised trade name, in the matter of sales at a differential of
lc per quart. The case of Terminal Warehouse Company v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad'7 held that even though a warehouseman had
been discriminated against by a railroad' in favor of another
warehouseman, if he was denied reparation by the interstate
Commerce Commission against the railroad, this precluded him
from maintaining suit for damages. The case of Georgia Rail-
way and Electric Co. v. City of Decatur 7 held that the equal
protection clause forbids a municipality to authorize paving as-
sessments against the street railway company without regard to
benefits. This last case can not be said to be illiberal.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS
One of the most progressive and important decisions rendered
in the October 1935 term was that of Grosjean v. American Press
Company,79 which upheld freedom of the speech and the press
by extending the due process clause to include the protection of
freedom of the press against unlawful taxation. The Supreme
Court had already extended the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the protection of freedom of speech and
the press.8 0 This decision protected newspapers against taxation
as no one else is protected, but this does not detract from the
75. 297 U. S. 266, 56 S. Ct. 457, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 475 (1936).
76. 297 U. S. 251, 56 S. Ct. 453, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 469 (1936).
77. 297 U. S. 500, 56 S. Ct. 546, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 494 (1936).
78. 297 U. S. 620, 56 S. Ct. 606, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 614 (1936).
79. 297 U. S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 459 (1936) ; 49 ltar. L.
Rev. 998; 4 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 347.
80. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. ed. 1357 (1931).
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merits of the decision. Newspapers are the only ones who can
invoke the protection of freedom of the press.
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The case of Brown v. State of Mississippi~i extended the pro-
tection of the due process clause to include protection against
self-incrimination. This case has already been referred to.
OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS
Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 2 held that a state act codi-
fying building and loan association statutes and altering share-
holders withdrawal rights was an unconstitutional impairment
of the obligation of contracts, since the act was not aimed at
conserving or equitably administering the assets in interest of
all the members. International Steel and Iron Company v. Na-
tional Surety Co.,$3 held that the obligation of contracts in the
bond of a contractor for the benefit of a subcontractor was im-
paired by a state statute discharging the obligation of such bond
and substituting another bond without acquiescence of the obli-
gee, since the court could not find any proper exercise of the
police power in such an act. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins,8 4
held that the reservation of power to amend a corporation's
charter in a state constitution, being a part of the contract,
makes the provision in the federal constitution prohibiting the
impairment of the obligation of contracts inoperative, so that a
state may abrogate a common law fellow servant rule though
included in a corporation's charter, at least if it is a proper
exercise of the police power. These cases are mine run cases on
the subject of impairment of the obligation of contract and do
not call for special comment.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Supreme Court rendered a reactionary decision involving
the guarantee of searches and seizures in Jones v. Securities and
Exchange Commission.": In this case the Supreme Court held
that the Securities and Exchange Commission was without power
81. 297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 479 (1936); 36 Col. L.
Rev. 832 (1936).
82. 297 U. S. 189, 56 S. Ct. 408, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 391 (1936).
83. 297 U. S. 657, 56 S. Ct. 619, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 585 (1936).
84. 297 U. S. 629, 56 S. Ct. 611, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 642 (1936).
85. 298 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 654, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 655 (1936).
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to compel a person to submit to an examination pursuant to a
subpoena issued following a first subpoena duces tecum when a
registrant had withdrawn his registration statement on the day
of the second subpoena, on the theory that the registrant had
the unqualified power to withdraw his registration statement
pending proceedings; and that it would amount to little more
than a roving fishing expedition. This decision may have some
bearing upon the validity of Senatorial investigations.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS
In the case of Hill v. United States ex rel. Wampler,0 the
Supreme Court held that imprisonment for debt did not amount
to a cruel and unusual punishment. People who have been labor-
ing under the impression that imprisonment for debt had long
since been abolished in the United States may be surprised to
know that it continues constitutionally in the case of non-pay-
ment of alimony, in the case of non-payments of a fine for con-
tempt, in the case of a violation of an order of an equity court
to pay money, and in the case of non-payment of a criminal fine.
Hence if the people of the United States desire completely to
abolish imprisonment for debt, they must do more than bar cruel
and unusual punishments.
COMPENSATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN
McCandless v. United States,8 7 held that in condemnation by
eminent domain, the owner is entitled to the most profitable use
to which his land can profitably be put in the reasonably near
future even only if such use can be made in connection with other
lands. This decision was in harmony with prior decisions on this
point.
FEDERAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
One of the most reactionary and startling decisions of the
judicial period under consideration was that of Colgate V. Har-
vey,88 in which the Supreme Court extended the scope of the
privileges and immunities clause to include the protection of the
"privilege of acquiring, owning, and receiving income for in-
vestments outside a state." This case reversed a policy which
86. 298 U. S-, 56 S. Ct. 760, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 849 (1936).
87. 298 U. S.-, 56 S. Ct. 764, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 797 (1936).
88. 296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 225 (1935).
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had continued from the time of the Slaughter-House cases89 to
this recent decision. The Supreme Court had confined the scope
of the United States privileges and immunities clause to the pro-
tection of only those interests which grow out of the relationship
between the citizen and the national government. This recent
decision seems to open the door to the protection of all the funda-
mental rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of the Bill of
Rights and all of the fundamentals, rights, powers, privileges,
and immunities of the common law, as privileges and immunities
of the United States citizenship. If so, there is the danger that
the social control permitted under the contract clause, commerce
clause, and the due process clause will be denied under the United
States privileges and immunities clause and personal liberty pro-
tected against what have come to be regarded as proper exer-
cises of the police power, the power of taxation and the power
of eminent domain. However, in Whitfield v. State of Ohio,91 the
Supreme Court held that a state statute prohibiting the sale of
prison made goods from other states was not a violation of the
United States privileges and immunities clause, where the stat-
ute also prohibited such sales of goods made by convict labor in
that state, so that the final position of the United States Supreme
Court is still somewhat of a matter of doubt.
EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT
In this term there was one other case on the effect of the re-
peal of the eighteenth amendment. In United States v. Rizzo,91
the Supreme Court held that the repeal of the eighteenth amend-
mnt did not preclude the collection of taxes on alcohol since they
were not penalties but basic taxes.
SUPREMACY OF THE SUPREME COURT
The recent tendency towards curbing government control
either by the states or the nation has resulted in expanding the
judicial power of review. Hence whatever limits the Supreme
Court may have put upon the states or upon other branches of
the federal government, it apparently does not believe in putting
a limit upon itself. In the past, the Supreme Court rendered
some decisions which were so unpopular that they threatened
89. 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394 (1873).
90. 297 U. S. 431, 56 S. Ct. 532, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 527 (1936).
91. 297 U. S. 530, 56 S. Ct. 580, 80 L. ed. (adv.) 571 (1936).
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to affect its supremacy, but in spite of the Dred Scott decision,
the Income Tax Cases, the Legal Tender Cases, and the Prohibi-
tion Cases, the Supreme Court was able to steer a course that
enabled it to maintain its own authority. It has recently again
rendered some very unpopular decisions against social control
either by the states or the nation and against the authority of
the national government over the control of industry and agri-
culture. These decisions again are raising the question of
whether the Supreme Court has at last made such egregious
blunders that it will be impossible for it to continue in the future
to maintain the supremacy which it has succeeded in maintain-
ing throughout our prior history.
CONCLUSIONS
Most of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court dur-
ing the past year have been commendable and can invoke noth-
ing but praise. There will be general agreement that the Su-
preme Court was extending our constitutional law in the right
direction when it enlarged the states' general police power and
the states' power of taxation. There will be general agreement
that the Supreme Court rendered the right decisions when it
upheld the federal government's general money powers and its
powers to operate the Tennessee Valley Authority. There will
be no objection to the effort on the part of the Supreme Court
to put more vitality into our doctrine of separation of powers
and to check the process of delegation of legislative authority.
There will have to be acquiescence in the court's pronouncements
upon the subject of sovereignty. The court's extension of due
process of law to protect the freedom of the press and to protect
against self-incrimination will meet with applause. Most of the
other decisions continue tendencies of which the thinking people
of the United States generally approve.
But this commendation does not extend to all of the decisions
of the court rendered in this period. In the past year, as in deci-
sions for the past two or three years, there has been a tendency
to confine the meaning of commerce to transportation. Such
decisions are only leading to confusion and can not meet with
approval. These decisions and other decisions are tending to
exempt big corporate business from all social control either by
the states or by the nation. Such a tendency can not but ulti-
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mately have unsocial effects. Much of our business has now be-
come national in scope. Recent decisions have refused to give
the federal government control over such business. These deci-
sions do not mark a forward but a backward movement in con-
stitution making. Not only this, but recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court have tended to destroy the doc-
trine of federal supremacy over the states and in place thereof
to set up something, which at first looks like state supremacy,
but which finally fades out into a vicious doctrine of laissez-
faire. The doctrine of federal supremacy should be again re-
vived and established, and capitalistic business should be taught
that in the United States there is no business or class superior
to the constitution.
The bad effects to which we have just referred have been the
result of three classes of decisions. (1) Those involving the
United States privileges and immunities clause; (2) those in-
volving the due process clause; and (3) those involving our dual
form of government.
The decision enlarging the scope of the United States privi-
leges and immunities at first seems to have the effect of destroy-
ing our dual form of government by destroying the power of
the states and establishing that of the federal government; but
a more careful analysis of this decision reveals that the only
power of the federal government established is the power of the
Supreme Court, and this is not a constructive power to estab-
lish social control by the federal government, but a negative
power merely to destroy social control by the states. When all
this is realized, of course, it is seen that the real result of this
decision is simply to protect the capitalistic system.
The denial to the states under the due process clause as a
matter of substance of the power to pass minimum wage laws
in the exercise of the police power, when coupled with the fact
that the federal government is also denied the power to pass
minimum wage laws, again shows that the Supreme Court is
more concerned with the interests of certain great industrialists
than it is with social progress in the United States.
The recent decisions on our dual form of government seem to
have a two-fold tendency. In the first place, they tend to estab-
lish a doctrine of state supremacy in place of a doctrine of fed-
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eral supremacy. In the second place, they tend to establish an
immunity for business national in scope against all social con-
trol.
The doctrine of federal supremacy is one that has been ad-
hered to from the time of Chief Justice Marshall down to these
latest decisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court still
adheres to the position that the commerce power may regulate
intrastate rates, the safe conduct of transportation, a compensa-
tion for injury, hours of labor, and shipment of prison-made
goods; but now it takes the position that the commerce power
may not regulate deferred payments in the form of pensions, nor
goods manufactured by child labor, nor labor conditions in the
production of coal. Mr. Justice Roberts acted with Justices
Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo in the case of New York regula-
tion of the price of milk, the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium
law, and Congressional Devaluation of the Standard of the Gold
Dollar (and, of course, in the T. V. A. decision); but when it
came to labor legislation as in the Railway Pension Act, the
Guffey Coal Act and the New York Minimum Wage Law, he
found that he must act with Justices Butler, McReynolds, Suther-
land, and Van Devanter. The doctrine of federal supremacy is
not only clearly stated in the original constitution and in im-
portant decisions of the United States Supreme Court, but it is
one that the nature of our form of government makes an im-
pelling necessity. Any doctrine of state supremacy will lead
only to chaos. Forty-eight separate states are not in a position
to exercise social control over a capitalistic system national in
scope. Any social control to be adequate will also have to be
national in scope. This was seen by the genius of Chief Justice
Marshall. Our constitution making will never be finished until
this doctrine is again revived and placed on the exalted level
where it belongs.
Probably the purpose of the Supreme Court in the decisions
which are being criticized was not so much to establish a doc-
trine of state supremacy as to give an immunity to big business
from social control. The result of the commerce decisions was
to create a no-man's land where neither the federal government
nor the states have power to exercise social control over the
activities of businesses national in scope, no matter how unsocial
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they may tend to be. These decisions have been some of the
most pernicious ever rendered by the Supreme Court. A majority
of the Supreme Court has been and is perfectly willing to have
personal liberty delimited by social control where there is suffi-
cient reason for so doing provided such control does not apply
to the capitalistic system, but apparently it regards the capi-
talistic system as so sacrosanct that it must not be touched by
anything so unholy as governmental regulation. This, of course,
is just what is desired by the American Liberty League, the Con-
stitutional Democrats, and the other disciples of the fetish of
laissez faire. Justices Roberts, Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland,
and Van Devanter, therefore, are spokesmen for this class in
our economic order. Of course, if these five majority justices
had undertaken to establish such a doctrine by Congressional
legislation, their position would soon have been reversed at the
polls by the people of the United States, but when they estab-
lished this doctrine as Justices of the United States Supreme
Court, it is not so easy to reverse their position. No one can give
any valid reason for exempting the personal liberty of capital-
ists from social control where social interests demand such con-
trol, and it would seem that the people of the United States must
ultimately find some method for subjecting their personal liberty
to social control.
The identification with Bolshevism and Russia of the social
control attempted by the Roosevelt administration over our eco-
nomic order would be ludicrous if it had not been received so
seriously by the great mass of business men. It would have been
nearer the truth if this social control had been identified with
the social control over economic matters found in England,
Sweden and other democratic countries. Practically all of the
various schemes of social control found in the Roosevelt program
including the Securities and Exchange Act, housing program,
subsidies to agriculture, processing taxes, quota system, income
and inheritance taxes, social insurance, public works programs,
collective bargaining, and other forms of labor legislation are
found in these other countries, if the United States legislation
did not actually copy the legislation of these other countries.
These other countries have a more highly managed economy
than the Roosevelt administration ever thought of attempting,
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and have adopted many elements of Socialism when the Roose-
velt administration went in this direction only in the case of the
Tennessee Valley Authority.9 2 Yet the very men who have
,damned the Roosevelt administration have praised the English
system and compared the Roosevelt system unfavorably with it.
What is the reason for this? The reason must be either deliber-
ate falsification or the densest kind of ignorance on the part of
the business class in the United States, including the newspaper
men. It is probably a case of sheer ignorance. The "economic
royalists" only know that they are opposed to Roosevelt and
know little else. They want no social control, but they do want
personal liberty, and they propose to defeat any and all social
control even if it is necessary to go to the length of damning
as devices of Bolshevistic and Fascistic governments forms of
social control adopted by the most democratic countries on earth.
Whether there is any truth in their statements is a matter of
least concern.
It was not necessary for the Supreme Court to render the deci-
sions which we have criticized although the majority rendering
them has pretended there was such necessity. One Justice even
went so far as naively to maintain that what the Supreme Court
did was to put the constitution and the statute side by side and
to compare the statute with the constitution; and, if the statute
did not correspond with the constitution, to declare the statute
unconstitutional. Of course, it should be noted in the first place,
that the constitution with which the statute was compared was
a constitution made by the Supreme Court. This was a fact
which apparently the justice overlooked. In the second place it
should be noted that during the course of United States history
the Supreme Court, at different times, has made different con-
stitutions. There were, therefore, many constitutions for the
Justice to choose from. If he had wanted to, he could have chosen
a different constitution than the one he did choose. Whatever
constitution or law he applied was a law which the Supreme
Court had made. The Supreme Court (majority) in important
cases has not applied the law as it stood at the time of its pro-
nouncements, but has gone back to such cases as Lochner v. New
York, 1905; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 1923; Hammer v.
92. Lindley, "If This Be Despotism." 100 Scribner's Magazine 129.
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Dagenhart, 1918; United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 1895; and
Collector v. Day, 1870. With the exception of Hammer v. Dagen-
hart and Adkins v. Children's Hospital, all of these cases were
cases which it was supposed had been overruled and these two
cases it was supposed the Supreme Court would sometime over-
rule. After having selected this constitution to compare the law
with, of course, the Supreme Court could declare that the law
was contrary to the constitution. It was not contrary to the con-
stitution which the four dissenting justices believed in nor to
the constitution which most of their predecessors believed in,
but it was contrary to the constitution which the five justices
constituting the majority at this particular time believed in.
What these justices really meant was that the law was con-
trary to the American economic system recently created by a few
financial magnates. This American economic system had not
existed throughout our history and was not peculiar to all Amer-
icans, but only to that of the new financial magnates who now
control the capitalistic system. This apparently is what others
today mean when they talk about "standing by the constitution"
and "going back to the constitution." Our constitution once guar-
anteed one economic system-slavery. It is to be hoped it does
not now guarantee another. It is very convenient for the people
to talk about going back to the constitution when they have a
choice of, or can make, the constitution to which they can go
back.
Our constitution is not today what it was a year ago. What-
ever changes it has undergone are the work of the Supreme
Court. Some of the constitution has been improved. Some of
the Constitution has been made worse. Much of the work of the
Supreme Court has been unsatisfactory and should be repudi-
ated. How can this be done? And how can work of this sort be
prevented in the future?
Various schemes have been suggested. One scheme would be
the packing of the court. It has been claimed that bad decisions
of the court in the past have been cured in this way.93 This
method of attaining the result desired would be constitutional.
The constitution does not prescribe the number of justices. Con-
93. Bradner-Smith, Congress vs. The Supreme Court-A Constitutional
Amendment (1936) 22 Va. L. Rev. 665.
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gress could increase the number of justices for that august
tribunal. The President could then appoint enough new justices
to obtain a majority opposed to the position of the present
majority and thereby could obtain a reversal of the position of
the Supreme Court as to United States privileges and immuni-
ties, due process as a matter of substance and our dual form of
government. However, this method of obtaining the result is
very dangerous and not one that can be advocated. It would
weaken the standing of the United States Supreme Court if this
practice was frequently resorted to.
Another method of curbing the Supreme Court which has
been suggested would be the requirement by Congress of a seven
to two vote for nullification of an act of Congress and perhaps
acts of state legislatures. This method of curbing the Supreme
Court, if constitutional, would not correct past mistakes but
would tend to curb the power of the Supreme Court in the future.
If it only related to matters of social legislation, this method of
curbing the Supreme Court might not be objectionable; but if
it were to relate to legislation involving our dual form of govern-
ment, or the doctrine of separation of powers, or constitutional
guarantees, it would be pernicious. In such cases, the Supreme
Court should be able to declare an act of legislation either by
Congress or by the states unconstitutional by a majority vote.
However, any such piece of legislation would be unconstitutional
as an invasion of the power of the Supreme Court and a viola-
tion of the doctrine of separation of powers and the Supreme
Court would so declare. If the Supreme Court would put a volun-
tary limitation of this sort on itself, so far as concerns due
process as a matter of substance, the limitation would not only
be constitutional but a result devoutly to be wished for.
Another method of curbing the Supreme Court which has been
proposed is the recall of judicial decisions. What has been said
about the constitutionality of a requirement of a seven to two
vote, without an amendment to the constitution, would apply to
the recall of judicial decisions. There does not seem to be much
sentiment for this method of curbing the Supreme Court at the
present time and it will not be discussed further herein.
It has been proposed to curb the Supreme Court by taking
from it, and perhaps from other federal courts, by act of Con-
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gress jurisdiction over questions of due process as a matter of
substance.94 It has been argued that a large number of fre-
quently elected members of the legislative branch of the govern-
ment are in a better position to determine questions of social
policy than a few members in the judicial branch of the govern-
ment appointed for life. It may also be added that this is a power
which has been exercised by the judicial branch of the govern-
ment for only about fifty years. We got along very well without
the judiciary's exercise of this power up to that time and we
might get along well without its exercise of this power in the
future. Of course, taking this power away from the Supreme
Court now would not cure past decisions but it might prevent
some bad decisions in the future. Most of the criticism of the
Supreme Court until the past year has related to its decisions
on due process as a matter of substance. This plan of curbing
the Supreme and other federal courts would be constitutional
under Art. III, Sec. 1, and Sec. 2 par. 2. This method of reform,
however, would not correct the decisions of the last year on our
dual form of government.
It has also been proposed to change the constitution made by
the Supreme Court by express amendments to the constitution.
If this method of curbing the Supreme Court was resorted to
amendments would have to be formulated, (1) changing the
meaning of the United States privileges and immunities clause
as it now stands, (2) either changing the doctrines announced
by the United States Supreme Court in its decisions on due
process as a matter of substance or taking this power entirely
away from the Supreme Court, and (3) giving the federal gov-
ernment a police power, or a power of regulation, over all eco-
nomic matters national in scope, either by an enlargement of its
commerce power and tax power, or by a general delegation of
power.-, Of course, these amendments would be constitutional
if adopted according to the constitutional method. This also
would be an effective way of getting the kind of a constitution
94. Martig, Congress and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 650.
95. Loeb, Constitutional Interpretation in a Transitional Period (1936)
21 ST. Louis LAW REv. 95; 4 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 381; Haines, Judicial Re-
view of Acts of Congress and the Need for Constitutional Reform (1936)
45 Yale L. J. 816.
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that we ought to have, but it seems absurd to have to amend the
constitution every time that the Supreme Court makes a wrong
decision. Of course, this has been done in the past in the case
of the slavery amendments, the income tax amendment, and the
prohibition amendment.9 6 If this practice were to be continued,
however, as a definite policy, it would in the course of time make
our federal constitution a monstrosity. For this reason, it would
seem that this method of curbing the Supreme Court and chang-
ing wrong constitution making should be abandoned.
Still another method of obtaining better constitution making
by the United States Supreme Court would be by obtaining bet-
ter justices for the Supreme Court. If it would be possible to
obtain better justices than those we have had, of course, they
should be obtained. So far as our present Supreme Court needs
a change in this respect, the change would have to wait for
vacancies in the personnel of the court. As these vacancies might
occur, if the President and the Senate in cooperation would select
the right kind of justices, probably this would solve the problem
which we are facing. The reason why we have been getting dur-
ing the past year or two the undesirable decisions which have
been handed down by the Supreme Court is if we may judge by
the best thought in the United States, because there are upon the
Supreme Court, justices who perhaps do not have the right view-
point as to the constitution they should make. During a few
prior administrations not enough care was given to the selection
of justices for the Supreme Court. Of course, there is no guar-
antee that any better care of this matter will be taken in the
future. If some scheme of further safeguarding the appoint-
ment of justices of the United States could be evolved, that would
be desirable. Some method of nomination of a list of candidates
from which the President might be required to nominate might
be as good a scheme as could be proposed. However, this scheme
to be constitutional would probably require an amendment to the
constitution and even if the constitution was amended to permit
it, it is questionable whether the scheme would be perfectly suc-
cessful.
There remains, therefore, as the only method for obtaining a
96. The Eleventh Amendment was also the result of a Supreme Court
Decision.
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better constitution than we have been obtaining, the Supreme
Court itself as it has been constituted, as it is not constituted,
or as it may ever be constituted. Perhaps the only thing that the
people of the United States can do is to trust the Supreme Court.
There is a possibility that the Supreme Court itself may, in the
course of time, correctly think through all of our governmental
and economic questions and finally come to a correct result. In
the give and take of discussion and argument, there is a possi-
bility that those members of the Supreme Court who have been
maintaining the right position may gradually convince their op-
ponents that they are correct and in this way the truth may
finally evolve.9 7 If this result does not come to pass with the
court as now constituted it may gradually come to pass with
changes in the personnel of the bench.
97. Corwin, Commerce Power versus State Rights (1936) 265; Willis,
Constitutional Law of the United States (1936) 114, 925.
